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ABSTRACT
VIEWS OF THE SELF AND THEIR ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
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,
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Directed by: Professor Gareth Matthews
This thesis examines some views of the self and
investigates the ethical implications of these views. The
working hypothesis is that our ethical principles are
conditioned by what we hold to be the nature of the self.
My investigation of the self concerns the question of
whether there is a metaphysical self which functions as
the subject of human experience, that is, which thinks,
feels and acts. I conclude that there is no such self.
Next, I investigate how our thinking about persons and our
moral principles are affected by the denial of the self.
I conclude that some principles of moral responsibility
such as promise keeping are unaffected for they only
presuppose psychological continuity. However, principles
of distributive justice may be affected in scope and
weight
.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In "this thesis I investigate the question of whether
there is a permanent self which is the subject of human
experience. Is there an entity or substance which thinks
one’s thoughts and is the agent of one’s actions?
Although they may disagree about its nature many
philosophers would claim that there is such a subject of
experience or self. For instance, the brain, the body or
even some immaterial substance or soul could plausibly be
considered to be the self. Here I will be largely
concerned with the self considered as a metaphysical
entity or immaterial substance, separate from the brain,
body, and mental and physical events.
One’s views on personal identity may well be affected
by one’s view of the self. If there is a metaphysical
self and if personal identity is based on facts about such
selves, then personal identity is based on an ’’ultimate
fact and the question of identity has a definitive, yes-
or-no answer. Identity does not admit of degree. On
the
other hand, if personal identity is only based on
the
continued existence of the brain, the body or
certain
psychological features (e.g. memories, beliefs
and
desires), then the fact that we say that one person
at one
time is the same as another at another time
may be more a
.
. TTlfimatelv, a person’s brain and
matter of convention. Ultimat y p
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body and psychological features change In time and, in
some cases, the changes are quite significant. If there
is no metaphysical self, it is reasonable to consider
personal identity to be a matter of degree so as to
reflect the observable changes in body and mind.
Derek Par fit has advanced the view that human
experience can be completely explained in terms of a set
of impersonal elements that excludes the metaphysical
self. These elements include: a brain and body, mental
and physical events, and a degree of psychological
connection and continuity. The elements are said to be
impersonal because they do not presuppose the existence of
a person. The fact that we speak of a "subject of
experience" or say "a person has experiences" may be a
reflection of language and convention not of reality. If
so, there is thinking and doing, but there is no real self
which is the subject of these activities.
The view that there is a real, unchanging self or
soul is held by many religious traditions which tend to
give the self or soul great ethical and ontological
significance. This view is consistent with our common
sensical view. Ve tend to think of our lives as though
there was a single "person" living throughout. Reid
describes this view of the self in the following passage:
my personal identity . . . implies the continued existence
of that indivisible thing that I call myself. Whatever
this self may be, it is something which thinks, and
deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am
not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling, I am
something that thinks, and acts, and suffers.
'
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Although he does not claim to know the nature of the
"self” in its entirety, he argues for its existence on the
basis of two claims: 1) the self is required to explain
the facts of personal identity (the continuing existence
J^ysslf) and 2) the self is required because thinking
requires a thinker and acting requires an actor.
The view that there is no separate entity or
metaphysical self is held in the Vest by empiricism and in
the East by philosophical Buddhism^. Hume argues against
the existence of the self by denying that there is an
entity which is permanent or identical through time. He
points out that the idea that people often have of a
permanent self (or, in general, of an object identical
through time) results from a general tendency to mistake a
succession of related objects for an Identical object.
This idea of an identical entity is only achieved through
a distortion of the empirical fact that our perceptions
are actually changing. Such is the case with regard to
the identity we ascribe to plants, animals and the mind:
In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity, we
often feign some new and unintelligible principle, that
connects the objects together, and prevents thei
interruption or variation. Thus we feign the continu’
existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove
the interruption [that actually exists]; and run into
the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to
disguise the variation.
For Hume, the self or soul, considered as a permanent
entity identical through time, is illusory.
3
I will investigate the question of the self by
analysing some approaches and arguments given for and
against various views of the self. I will be largely
concerned with the question of whether there is a
metaphysical self. Secondly, I will investigate the moral
implications of the view that there is no real self. How
does the nature of self affect moral responsibility? Are
our views on desert and commitment a function of whether
there is a metaphysical self? How are certain moral
principles, such as principles of distributive justice,
affected by what we determine the self and personal
Identity to be?
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CHAPTER I I
VIEWS OF THE SELF
A. kn EiaDlrlcal Approach to the Self
Derek Parfit., in Reasons and Persons
. has "taken up
the empiricist cause armed with an array of Twentieth-
century thought experiments. He makes effective use of
the idea of teletransportation and brain fission to shed
light on, and perhaps to undermine, our common sense
notions of self and personal identity. The principle view
of self under contention is the view that the self is a
metaphysical entity that is the subject of experience
(i.e. of thinking, acting, and feeling).
One argument which Parfit gives against the view that
there is a separate entity which is the subject of
experience is that we would have no way of knowing whether
there is a single such entity or whether there is a series
of such entities psychologically continuous with one
another'’. By psychological continuity, he means
continuity on the basis of memories and the continued
existence of intentions, interests, beliefs and other
psychological features. Assuming that there is a series
of entitles, memories and other psychological features
might be passed from one entity to another just as a baton
is passed from one runner to the next in a relay race®.
Since what we are aware of when we reflect on the past
includes only our memories and other kinds of
5
psychological connection, we have no way of knowing
whether there has been a single continuous entity or
whether there has been a series of entities.
Parfit uses the thought experiment of
teletransportation to illustrate how, even if the self was
a metaphysical entity, we would have no way of knowing
that the current self was not just one in a series of such
entities*". If the belief in a metaphysical self requires
that we admit the possibility of a series of such selves,
the belief becomes less plausible. In teletransportation,
our bodies and brains are scanned to obtain the exact
state of our body chemistry. This information is then
transmitted to our destination, Mars say, where an
instrument receives the signal and creates an exact
replica of the original. There are two versions of the
experiment - one in which the original is destroyed and
another, termed the ’’branch-line case”, in which the
original is able to continue living for a time. In either
case, the replica created on Mars wakes as though from a
short nap. He has the same memories as the original; he
has the same feelings toward family and friends. He is by
all appearances the same person.
Let us assume that we have an example of the branch-
line case‘s. Suppose that at the moment just prior to
scanning, the original has the thought, ’’Snow is falling”.
Then just after the scan, which is Instantaneous, he has
the thought, ”So it must be cold”. The replica, on the
other hand, wakes up a moment later in a similar cubicle
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on Mars with the apparent memory, "Snow is falling". He
then thinks, "So it must be cold". The replica and the
original have, at this point, the same state of mind. For
example, both have the memory, "Snow is falling".
Further, they both have psychological continuity with the
past for the past is equivalently represented in both
brains. But in the case of the replica, though there is
psychological continuity, it is a fact that the memory,
"Snow is falling", and those which precede it ought to be
attributed to another entity. However, the replica has no
way of knowing that this is so.
The thought experiment suggests that the existence of
psychological continuity (e.g. memories) does not imply
the continuity of "self" existence. A given self has no
way of knowing that there have not been other, prior
selves which were psychologically continuous with each
other and with the current self. He is only aware of
something less - namely the psychological continuity
between his life and the preceeding ones.
Anyone studying this thought experiment who accepts
Parfit’s claim that everything that happens in it could
happen, in principle anyway, will be receptive to Parfit’s
"Reductionist" view of personal identity. The
Reductionist view assumes that a human being can be
completely described in terms of impersonal elements. The
term "impersonal" is used because the existence of a
person, an entity separate from the elements, does not
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have to be supposed in order to describe a human being.
Specifically, the view states that human existence
consists in the existence of a brain and body; the
occurrence of physical and mental events; and the
existence of psychological continuity by means of
overlapping strong chains of psychological connectivity
(including direct memory connections, the connection
existing between the holding of an intention and a later
act in which the intention is carried out, and the holding
of interests, beliefs, attitudes and other psychological
attributes over time) . ®
One objection to the experiment is to reject it for
being inconceivable. If one held that a metaphysical self
or soul was required to have a human being, then it would
be inconceivable that the Replica could be created as it
is in the experiment. Without a soul, the Replica would
be an inert mass of chemicals. However, even these ’’Non-
reductionists” after studying the experiment might well
consider the possibility that our memories could be
memories of some previous self - as far as we can tell.
All we have access to when we look into our pasts is our
memories. However unlikely it may seem, it is conceivable
that our memories are memories of other selves
psychologically continuous with us.
A second thought experiment employed by Parfit
involving brain fission has more authority because the
technology involved is more realistic. As is well known,
the left and right hemispheres of the brain have different
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functions: the left hemisphere houses the speech
faculties and is largely involved in sense and motor
control of the right side of the body; the right
hemisphere is similarly tied in with the left side of the
body. In certain patients having severe epileptic
seizures, the corpus callosum, the bundle of nerve fibers
connecting the two hemispheres, were severed. Researchers
then discovered that by giving different instructions to
the left and right visual field of these patients, they
could be led to be simultaneously engaged in two
independent tasks. This fact of independent, simultaneous
functioning of the two hemispheres might lead one to
conclude that there are in effect two minds. However, in
day to day life, these patients are able to function
normally. They are able to integrate the functioning of
the two hemispheres quite sucessfully to the point where
they appear to be ordinary one-minded people. (The often
noted exception is the patient who found himself embracing
his wife with one arm and pushing her away with the
other.
)
Parfit capitalizes on the fact of the independent
functioning of the two hemispheres to build his ’’split-
brain” thought experiment. Suppose, there were a way to
disconnect temporarily the corpus callosum of a person who
was one of the minority of persons whose hemispheres are
supposed to be equal in ability. Assume that this person
has control over this brain splitting and chooses to go
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Into thiB "divided” mode in order to solve in parallel some
problems on a physics exam. Parfit reports this person's
thinking from their point of view:
When 1 disconnect my hemispheres, my stream of
consciousness divides. But this division is not
something that I experience. Each of my two streams of
consciousness seems to have been straightforwardly
continuous with my one stream of consciousness up to the
moment of division. The only changes in each stream are
the disappearance of half my visual field and the loss
of sensation in, and control over, one of my arms.
Consider my experiences in my "right-handed" stream. I
remember deciding that I would use my right hand to do
the calculation. This I now begin. In working at this
calculation I can see, from the movements of my left
hand, that I am also working at the other. But I am not
aware of working at the other. I might, in my right-
handed stream, wonder how, in my left-handed stream, I
am getting on. I could look and see. This would be
just like looking to see how well my neighbor is doing
at the next desk. . . . '^
This thought experiment is made plausible by the fact that
this kind of human behavior has been observed (granted
only externally).
If we accept that two Independent thought processes
could occur in "one mind" or one brain, then we have a
basis for an argument that integrated thinking processes
do not require a separate self. If we were to assume that
a separate entity (which has thoughts) is required in
order to have thinking, then it would be difficult to
explain the above thought experiment. One would have to
explain how we got from one "I" to two "I" 's. We would
have to determine whether the two "I" ’s which come into
existence are in fact the same as the original "I" or
whether one is the original "I", but the other is
10
different. Ve would have to say that since the left "I"
(ID is independent of the right ”1” (12), they are
different from each other (that is, II does not equal 12).
In addition, since each new *’ i” appears to be continuous
with the old "i” do) (with the exception of the loss of
visual field and sensation), each of the two "I” 's has an
equal claim to being the original (i.e. it can be claimed
II = lo and 12 = lo which entails that II = 12). But,
they cannot both be the original because they are
different from each another. The only other option is
that at the time of brain fission the original self, lo,
is destroyed and two new selves, II and 12, come into
existence. This option is also problematic because one
would have to explain where the new selves came from. The
notion that there is an "I” is false in this experiment.
Ve can represent the argument (involving the first option)
as follows:
1. SHOW: it is not the case that a thinking
process requires a self or subject.
2. A thinking process requires a self. assumption
3. In brain fission there are two observation
independent thought processes.
4. In brain fission there are two selves, 2,3
II and 12.
5. If two selves are independent, then Def. of self
they are not identical.
6. II does not equal 12
7. Because they are psychologically premise
continuous with the prefission self,
lo, II = lo and 12 = lo.
11
8. II 12
7
9. 11-12 and II does not equal 12 6,6
The Reductionist view, because it does not posit any
entity beyond the thinking process and the other empirical
facts, accomodates the facts of this experiment without
problem. On the Reductionist view, since there is a
of psychological continuity between the original
self, lo, and the two new selves, II and 12, there is a
degree of personal Identity or personal sameness. One is
not required to say that the old self and the new selves
are entirely the same or different. The ’’all or nothing”
claims that lead to contradictions such as is found in
step 9 above are avoided.
Thomas Nagel reaches a similar conclusion on the
basis of the facts of the scientific tests performed on
actual patients’’-’. He argues that one is not justified in
concluding either that these patients have two minds or
selves (because experimentally they demonstrate
independent mental processing) or that they have one mind
or self (because they demonstrate integration of function
in day to day life). His conclusion is that significant
conscious mental activity, as exemplified by these
patients, does not require a single mental subject or a
single self. As the experiments demonstrated, there can
be two independent thought processes within people who at
other times appeared to be a single mental subject or
self. Further, he claims that the idea of a single mental
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subject is illusoiry, even for normal people, because lb
masks the reality of integration between hemispheres that
is actually taking place-
The Reductionist point of view, however much it is
compatible with these thought experiments, is incompatible
with our common sense notion of the self and the
continuity of personal identity. Further, it seems to be
in conflict with those religious myths found in
Christianity and in Hinduism that posit the existence of
an underlying soul. In much religious thought, the soul
is the human being’s point of contact with God. It is
also the basis for the morality of love, for the profound
respect that many feel we should have for other people
regardless of the particular personality they may have.
It is worth considering whether the Reductionist view
simply undermines the values of Western culture or whether
it can be seen more progressively as part of a dialectical
evolution of our culture. For now, with so much as stake,
I will consider a point of view different from the
Reductionist one and more sympathetic to our common sense
notions.
B. The Self as Subject
Colin McGinn, in The Character Mind, considers
thought experiments similar to those that Parfit uses, but
he comes to different conclusions. McGinn considers the
case of a person whose memories, character traits and
so
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on in oneare extirpated by a super-scientist and,
version, are replaced by the exact same ones. ’ ’ In
another version, they are replaced by memories and
character traits of a completely different person.
Suppose we have an instance of the first case, in which
the patient's memories are extinguished and then replaced
a moment later
. McGinn states that if you are the person
(or self) undergoing the operation, it is implausible to
claim that you do not survive, even though there has been
mental discontinuity. He takes this to be a refutation of
the Reductionist view that mental continuity is a
necessary condition for continuity of selfhood or personal
identity.
This objection is valid if we take "mental
continuity" during a given period of time to mean that at
each moment in that period there are other moments
adjacent to it such that there is an overlapping of
psychological states between a given moment and adjacent
moments. Certainly, if there was a complete blank at a
given moment, there would be a psychological discontinuity
on this definition. On Parfit’s definition of mental
continuity, the moment of memory extinction would not
constitute a discontinuity and, therefore, the example
does not present a good objection. For Parfit,
psychological continuity is established by the existence
of overlapping chains of psychological connections such as
the connection established by the existence of a memory.
The fact that after the moment of memory annihilation, the
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person has memories from the time previous to the
annihilation entails that there is a psychological
connection and, therefore, mental continuity. Recall
Parfit s teletransportation thought experiment where there
is continuity of personal Identity between the original
and the replica even though before the moment of
te le transportat i on
,
the replica did not exist as a
physical entity.
This thought experiment is actually very similar to
the teletransportation one because in both cases an
individual’s psychological state is created
instantaneously. In both cases the ’’new” individual’s
mind is constituted with memories and other psychological
connections which give the appearance that they had been
living for some time. The two experiments differ,
however, in that in McGinn’s experiment there is physical
continuity while in the teletransportation experiment
there is not. Perhaps McGinn is implicitly arguing for a
physical criterion for continuity of identity.
Let us now consider the second version of McGinn’
s
thought experiment, the one in which the memories and
character traits introduced are completely different from
the ones that had been extinguished. McGinn claims that,
although a different person is created, the ’’self”,
understood as the subject of experience, remains and is
numerically identical to the self that existed prior to
the operation. Regardless of the fact that the new
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’’person” has different memories, beliefs and different
ways of thinking, the self remains the same. Clearly, for
McGinn psychological continuity is not required to have
continuity of self-existence. McGinn claims that the self
is a simple substance whose essential nature can be
captured only in non-reduct ive terms. In other words, the
nature of the self is not expressed by describing mental
phenomena such as chains of psychological connectedness.
Personal survival (survival of the self) consists in the
continued existence of the self or the supposed subject of
consciousness over time. The content of consciousness can
be a discontinuous as you like.
McGinn* s point of view is open to two responses.
First, it is open to Parfit’s criticism that one has no
way of knowing that there have not been a series of
selves psychologically continuous (or, in this case,
discontinuous) with one another. Second, since continuity
of self-existence is maintained even through a complete
psychological discontinuity, McGinn’s thought experiment
indicates that particular psychological attributes cannot
be associated with a given self. The self in this view
appears to be a kind of generic entity, an empty frame
before which the contents of consciousness flow by.
McGinn changes his tune somewhat when he considers the
thought experiments of brain fission and brain fusion.
However, he is still unable to abandon the conception
of
the self as a simple substance whose identity through
time
is required for survival. Consider the thought
experiment
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in which a brain is divided and then transplanted in two
other bodies creating, apparently, two separate people.
McGinn does not attempt to explain how the self, as a
simple substance, could survive brain fission although he
denies that the self is annihilated. The fact that from
the point of view of the physical basis of mind it makes
sense to talk of brain parts leads him to posit
tentatively the existence of ’’self parts”. Presumably, in
a case of brain fission, some of the self’s parts will go
to one of the new ’’persons” and some will go to the other.
Significantly, he is tending toward a conception of self
as being a complex substance rather than a simple one. He
does not go very far with this new concept, however. He
contends that there is an antinomy between the notion of a
simple, single self compatible with the ’’psychological
discontinuity” thought experiments and the idea of self-
like parts which is derived from fusion experiments (where
two half-brains from two different persons are fused to
form a single person) . I contend that this antinomy rests
on the idea that there is an entity, the metaphysical
subject of experience, in addition to the empirical facts:
the brain, the body and mental and physical activities.
C. Other Arguments Against Reductlonism
Made 11 in The Identity of the Self makes an argument
against the Reductionist view on the basis of a person’s
anticipation of pain. He argues that if I know some
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future person will be in pain, I am much less concerned by
the fact that that person will be psychologically
continuous with me (by virtue of having certain memories,
character traits, etc. ) than I am by the fact that that
person is me. Madell interprets the Reductionist view as
saying that:
the real object of concern as regards future pain is
that the person who will be in pain will have certain
memories and personality traits; and it seems absolutely
clear that this is not what one is afraid of at all.
What one is afraid of is just that the person who will
be in pain is oneself.''^
As an argument against the Reductionist view, this claim
is not convincing. It is more an indication that most
people are not Reductionists. Lfon-reduct ionists think
that their identity does not consist merely in
psychological continuity but consists in some further fact
about persons <i.e. the existence of a metaphysical self).
A Non-reductionist will be more concerned about a future
pain if he strongly believes that it will happen to
himself than he will be concerned by a pain which he
thinks will be experienced by someone merely
psychologically continuous with himself. A Reductionist
who conceived of personal identity as consisting only of
psychological continuity would have a different attitude
toward future pain. The Reductionist would be equally
concerned by the fact that a future person, with whom he
was psychologically continuous, would be in pain as the
18
that aNon-reductionist would be by the alleged
future person, who '* is” himself, will be in
fact
pain.
19
CHAPTER III
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NO-SELF VIEW
—
— lonis'b Consequences — an Overview
In this section, I will assess the impact of Parfit’s
Reductionist view, using as a starting point Parfit’s own
assessment. I will look at how our views on rationality
and morality are affected if we hold that there is no
real, permanent self or subject of experience and that
"personhood” only includes the existence of a body and
brain, the occurrence of mental and physical events, and
the existence of psychological and physical continuity.
Let me begin by discussing some Parfitian
terminology. Strictly speaking, on Parfit’s view, the
terms ’’self”, ’’person”, and ’’individual”, as they are
conventionally used, lack a referent. Conventionally, we
speak of selves, persons, and individuals as though they
were permanent, enduring entities, but, ultimately, we can
only be referring to aggregates of ’’impersonal elements” -
all of which are in flux. The Impersonal elements
include: the brain and body, the occurrence of mental and
physical events and the existence of psychological
continuity by means of overlapping chains of psychological
connections (including direct memory connections, the
connection existing between the holding of an intention
and an action in which the intention is carried out, etc. )
There is no ’’self” or ’’person” apart from the impersonal
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elements. However, within a lifetime there are often
periods of relative sameness or ’’person stages”. These
person stage can be referred to as ’’selves” or ’’persons”.
It is difficult to deny that a person’s body changes
throughout their life. It is clear that a child’s body is
different from that of an adult which in turn is different
from that of a person in advanced Psychological
change is also undeniable. It is quite normal for the
interests and beliefs of a child to change as a person
becomes an adult. The changes that occur in the brain are
perhaps less easily demonstrated for the brain is not
directly observable. However, there is much indirect
evidence from the field of psychology to Indicate that the
brain is also in flux. For example, Piaget has studied
the cognitive development of the human being and has found
that our cognitive capabilities are not acquired all at
once but sequentially during childhood. One could infer
that the brain is changing during the course of this
development. Even during adult years, the brain undergoes
change. After age twenty, studies indicate that one’s
mental capacity is reduced by about ten percent every ten
years. In the senility of old age, one can also assume
that the brain is undergoing change.
Because of the physical and psychological evidence
of physical and mental change, and in view of the
Reductionist denial of a metaphysical self uniting all the
stages of a given life, we might question our tendency to
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consider a ’’lifetime” as though it were lived by a single
entity. An alternative is to consider a lifetime as
though it were lived by a series of ’’person stages”. Such
a view is indeed suggested by the fact that there are
varying degrees of physical and psychological continuity
thoughout a lifetime. Periods of great continuity and,
therefore, relative sameness could be considered person
stages. Intervening periods of low continuity may be
considered to be transition periods between person stages.
Let us now analyse some of the supposed consequences
of the Reductionist view. Parfit claims that the
Reductionist view implies that personal identity is ’’less
deep” than it is on the Non-Reductionist view for the
latter view claims that personal identity ’’involves a
further fact” beyond psychological or physical
continuity.'-^' What does Parfit mean by the phrase
’’personal identity is less deep”? He means only that, on
the Reductionist view, the fact of personal identity
consists only of the empirical facts of physical
continuity and/or psychological continuity. It does not
include the existence of a metaphysical self or a subject
of ©xperience. Without a persisting, metaphysical self
underlying personhood, there is, no metaphysical basis for
considering a person or, rather, the series of person
stages over a lifetime <i.e. from birth to death) to be a
single entity. It is only by convention Con the basis of
physical and psychological continuity) that we refer to
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from birth to death. The Non-Reductionist view, on the
o"tlier hand, includes the fact of the existence of a
metaphysical self so it is ultimately true that a ’’person"
is a single entity throughout their life. Parfit’s claim,
because it amounts to a denial of a metaphysical self, is
metaphysical although his phrase - "less deep” - may be
somewhat misleading for it implies an empirical claim.
Parfit goes on to make the claim that, on the
Reductionist view, the connection between "myself" now,
the current person stage, and future and past person
stages is "less deep" and more like my connection to
contemporary others. This claim might be justified in
the following way. If, on the Reductionist view, there is
no metaphysical self connecting me to future or past
person stages then metaphysically my relation to future or
past stages is more like my relation to contemporary
others for, in both cases, there is no metaphysical
connection. Again, this is a metaphysical claim. Another
way of justifying this claim is to point out that there
are relations of similarity. Influence, and interest both
within a life (between different stages of life) and
between contemporary persons. In other words, just as
are similarities between myself now (the current
person stage) and later stages of "my life", there are
similarities with contemporary others. Also, just as I
share interests with future and past stages, so do I share
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them with contemporary others. If there Is not a
metaphysical self unifying a life, then the connection
between person stages within a life and the connections
between contemporaries are more alike. This is because in
both cases there is no metaphysical connection while
relations of similarity, interest and influence persist.
If there were a metaphysical self, then the connection
between different stages of a lifetime would Include a
metaphysical component which is lacking in the
relationship between contemporary others.
Parfit also makes a claim concerning the relationship
between personal identity and the degree of separateness
of different persons. He states that the fact that, on
the Reductionist view, the identity of an Individual is
"less deep” or "involves less” Ci.e. the fact that
identity does not presuppose a metaphysical self), implies
that the non-identity or separateness of different persons
is "less deep”. For Parfit, there is one fact, identity
or sameness of person, and the denial of that fact. If
personal identity is "less deep” or "involves less”, then
the denial of identity, that is, non-identity or
difference, is "less deep”.
If some unity is less deep so is the corresponding
disunity. The fact that we live different lives is the
fact that we are not the same person. If the fact of
personal identity is less deep so is the fact of non
identity. There are not two facts here, one of which is
less deep on the Reductionist view, while the other
remains as deep. There is merely one fact and this
fact’s denial. The separateness of persons is the
denial that we are all the same person. If the fact of
personal identity is less deep, so is its denial, ih.
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By saying that there is only one fact - personal identity
- and the denial of that fact, Parfit ties or relates the
separateness of persons to the identity of persons. This
is significant for otherwise the separateness of persons
would be uneffected by the denial of the metaphysical
self. For Parfit, one cannot discuss the separateness or
the difference of different human lives without reference
to the unity of a single life. The otherness or
separateness of different lives is derived from the
sameness or the unity of a single life and vice versa.
Separateness Cor difference) and unity (or sameness) are
polar opposites, each existing in dependence on the other.
The lessening of one polar opposite lessens the other.
Parf it ’
s
claim can also be approached in the
following way. Let us again suppose that there are
re lat ions of interest, similarity and influence (i.e.
psychological connectedness roughly) both between the
person stages in a lifetime and between contemporary
’’persons”. Parfit claims that the non-identity (or
difference) of contemporary persons is ’’less deep” or
’’involves less” if there is no self underlying and
unifying the ’’person stages” in a lifetime (i.e. if
personal identity is ’’less deep”). However, whether or
not there is in fact a metaphysical self, the relations of
similarity, interest and influence between contemporaries
are the same.ie. relationship or the connection
between contemporaty others would appear to be independent
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Ve can make sense of
of the question of the self.
Parfit’s claim if we assume he is implicitly using a
relational concept so that, when he says that the
separateness of
-persons” is less deep. he means that the
separateness of contemporary persons is less deep relative
to the depth of the connectedness between the ’’person
stages” in a lifetime (i.e. relative to the depth of
personal identity). If this is the case, then Parfit’s
claim is more plausible for personal identity is ’’less
deep” on the Reductionist view.
P^rfit claims other, more specific consequences for
Reductionism based on his view that the criterion for
continuity of personal identity is psychological
continuity. For example, he claims that future or past
’’selves” that are psychologically distant can be
considered to be different persons. Parfit implies that
since an individual’s lifetime is not tied together by a
metaphysical self, and since periods of an ’’individual’s”
life are sometimes psychologically separate, we might as
well adopt conventions that reflect the fact that people
change psychologically and appear to be different
’’persons” at different periods of their life. However, it
might be objected that there is often continuity between
the different ’’person stages” in a lifetime so that we
cannot say that the ’’person stages” are entirely
different. This objection v;ill be significant when we
come to discuss the ethical implications of the
Reductionist view. Parfit would respond by asserting that
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Is much"the degree of continuity between "person stages"
less than the "degree" of continuity within a "person
stage". Hence, it is more appropriate to represent an
"individual" as a series of person stages than as a single
"person"
.
Parfit also claims that personal Identity is a matter
of degree because psychological continuity is a matter of
degree. The implication of this claim is, presumably,
that where psychological continuity (and, therefore,
continuity of personal identity) exists only to a small
degree, then a change in personal identity is underway.
At first glance there may be a problem with this claim.
If one is familiar with the concept of continuity in
Cartesian mathematics, then the idea that there are
degrees of continuity may be quite foreign. However,
since Parfit defines psychological continuity on the basis
of overlapping chains of psychological connections (such
as direct memory connections) and since psychological
connections vary in their number and their strength, then
we might grant that psychological continuity can be a
matter of degree as the number and strenth of
psychological connections is bound to vary.
At this point we have considered some issues related
to Parfit’
s
general claim that "personal identity is less
deep. " I have postulated that this is a metaphysical
claim for it is based on the Reductionist denial that
there is a metaphysical self - the denial that there is
a
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experiences. Whenself that has (or is the subject of)
the metaphysical self is put aside, what is the effect?
The most significant result is that there are no
’’ultimate" criteria for establishing that there is
personal identity. Identity can only be based on
empirical facts such as psychological and physical
continuity. On these bases, the question of identity
ceases to have a definitive, yes—or—no answer in some
instances (such as brain fission). Without the
metaphysical self, personal identity becomes more
arbitrary. When the existence of a persisting,
metaphysical self is denied, the establishment of personal
identity is governed by conventions not by ultimate,
definitive facts.
Some may think that, whether or not there is a
metaphysical self, there is physical and psychological
continuity throughout a normal ’’ persons’ s" life and these
are the only objective, cognitively significant concepts
by which to determine if there is identity. On this view
personal identity is not significantly affected by the
metaphysical question. Clearly, one’s view of personal
identity is only affected by Reductionism if it had been
tied to the existence of a metaphysical self. If all
along one’s concept of personal identity was based on
empirical data like physical and psychological continuity,
it would be unaffected.
Parfit implies that many of us are closet Non-
reductionists with a tendency toward belief in a self even
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Without aif we deny it in our intellectual lives,
metaphysical self, there is less basis for thinking that
an ’’individual” is a single entity throughout their
lifetime. Ve may decide to think of a ’’person” at two
different times as being the same person (on the basis of
continuity) but this is by convention. Ultimately, the
matter of our bodies and the thoughts of our minds are
constantly changing however much it may appear to us
(based on our memories) that we are a single entity. If
there are stages of one’s life that are marked by
relative, qualitative sameness, and if these stages are
separated by periods of rapid change, then it is plausible
to consider these ’’person stages” as though they were
lived by different people. It is plausible on the basis
of two facts. First, there is no ultimate basis for
determining whether there is continuity of personal
identity, a concept which is conventional. Second, a
lifetime appears as though it was lived by a series of
different ’’persons”.
Later I will question whether Parfit’s stated
criterion of personal identity does in fact indicate that
personal identity necessarily changes in circumstances in
which observable changes (such as changes in desires and
intentions) occur. However, most would agree in principle
that if personal identity was established on the basis of
continuity of psychological characteristics, such as
memories, interests, intentions, then a change
in personal
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identity would be possible in the course of a period of
psychological transformation, where, if personal identity
was related to a metaphysical self, a change would not be
possible. Thus, it is plausible that different periods of
a life could be seen as being "lived” by different
" persons”
.
Let us now briefly mention some of the ethical
implications of these views. First, if it is plausible on
Parfit’s Reductionist view to see different periods of an
individual’s life as though they were lived by different
’’persons”, then principles of distributive justice may
apply within a lifetime - a morally significant result.
This conclusion is only valid if the person stages of a
given lifteime are sufficiently separate to be considered
separate persons and if principles of distributive justice
do in fact distribute between such ’’separate persons”.
There are alternative views which deserve mention at
this point. First, even if Reductionism is true,
principles of distributive justice may not apply within a
lifetime. It might be argued that the continuity that
exists between different person stages is sufficient to
connect up the various stages so that, for instance,
benefits to any one stage must be viewed as benefits to
all.'® Person stages are not suitable objects of just
distribution. Perhaps what matters is that chains of
person stages be justly treated.
Another view is that, even if Reductionism is false,
distributive justice may apply in a lifetime. Even if an
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individual is a single entity throughout their life, it
might be claimed that, for instance, benefits to it at one
time must not be viewed as benefits to it at all times.'®
Non-reduct ionism may be compatible with the application of
the distributive principle within a lifetime if it states
that equal benef its/burdens should be given to equally
deserving person stages. Since Non-reductionists may
admit the existence of person stages within a single
person’s life, this is a plausible approach.
Another significant ethical consequence of the
Reductionist view is based on the claim that the "person”
as an entity separate from the brain, body, and mental and
physical events does not exist, Just as a "nation" does
not exist as an entity separate from its citizens. By
this claim, when we refer to the experiences of different
persons, it is as though we are referring to citizens in
different countries. With respect to nations, Parfit
points out that we tend to focus on the citizens,
regarding them less as citizens (of a particular nation)
and more as people. Indeed, we tend to think that a
person’s nationality is not morally important. Similarly,
when considering persons on the Reductionist view, Parfit
states:
It becomes more plausible, when thinking morally, to
focus less upon the person, the subject of experiences,
and instead focus more upon the experiences themselves.
It becomes more plausible to claim that. Just as we are
right to ignore whether people come from the same or
different nations, we are right to ignore whethei
experiences come from the same or different persons.-*
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If, as Parfit indicates, it is right to Ignore ’’who" is
having experiences, then principles of distributive
justice, which are concerned with how things are
distributed among a group of persons (families,
organizations, etc.)
,
would be given less weight. Ve
shall consider this view in more detail later.
B. Reductionism and Rationality
In discussing the ethical and rational implications
of Reductionism, I will assume the following: if one
holds the Reductionist view and if one accepts Parfit’
s
psychological criterion for personal identity, then it is
plausible to consider different stages of an
’’individual’s’’ life as though they were "lived" by
different ’’persons".
The holding of the Reductionist view may, in the
first place, affect our views on rationality. In
particular, the truth of the Reductionist view may
undermine or require a change in the Self-interest Theory.
According to Parfit, the central claim of the ’Self-
interest Theory’ of rationality is:
CSl) For each person, there is one supremely rational
ultimate: that his life go, for him, as well as
possible.
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A further requirement of the Self-interest theory is the
Requirement of Equal Concern:
A rational person would be equally concerned about all
the parts of his future
.
If we hold the Reductionist view and accept Parfit’s
for personal identity, however, those parts of
one’s future life that are psychologically distant will
appear to some extent to be lived by some other person.
In contrast, if we held that there is a metaphysical self,
then a mere change in psychological characteristics would
by no means indicate a change in ’’person”. If we hold
that it is rational to care less about others, on the
Reductionist view it is rational to care less about
psychologically distant parts of our life. Parfit offers
an example: I might start smoking when I am a boy, full
knowing that I am likely to impose upon myself a premature
and painful death. While such an act would be irrational
according to the Classical Self-interest theory, it may be
rational on a revised theory which deems it rational to be
less concerned about those parts of one’s future to which
one is distantly connected.
Along these lines, we may devise a revised Self-
interest Theory which offers a discount rate with respect
to the degree of psychological connectedness. Eva
Bodansky following Parfit has recently offered the
following revised theory:
I think we may suppose that, for any pair of selves, Si
and Sj
,
the extent to which they are connected can be
represented by a number between 1 and 0, C(Si,SJ)....
Let ’V(Si)’ represent the extent to which things go well for
Si Each non-zero product C(Si,Sj) V (Sj ) will then
represent the extent to which things go well for one of Si’s
successive selves C SJ 3
,
weighted according to the connection
between that self and Si.
I suggest that one natural rendition of CSl) in this
Reductionist way of talking is:
(RSI) For each self, S, there is one supremely rational
ultimate aim: that the sum over all Si of C(S,Si) V(Si)
be maximal
.
While Bodansky and Parfit agree that such a revised Self-
interest Theory is required in light of Reduct ionism, they
differ on the significance of the changes in the revised
version. For Bodansky, the revised version is a mere
translation of the Classical Self-interest Theory into the
Reductionist language. Although she admits that in the
revised version, the requirement of equal concern is
dropped, she claims that the main point of the Self-
interest theory (S) is not lost. The revised theory can
still be contrasted with other theory of rationality in
much the way the old one can. In particular, she claims
that the revised S is still distinct from the Critical
Present-aim Theory (CP). Parfit, whose principle aim in
Reasons and Persons is to disprove S, claims that the
revised S is much more like CP — implying that S (whether
it is revised or not) does not survive the challenge of
Reduct i on ism. In my mind it is not clear that there is a
substantive difference between Bodansky’ s and Parfit’
s
positions. However, I tend to agree with Bodansky’ s
view
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that the revised S is ofstill a distinct theory
rationality that should not be hidden under the umbrella
of CP, On the Critical Present-ai m Theory:
CP; What I have most reason to do is what would best ful-
fill those of my presnt desires that are not
irrational
.
For our purposes, the two most significant elements of CP
are 1> that it is concerned with fulfilling present
desires (aims or projects or intentions) and 2) that the
desire (s) with which CP is concerned are left unspecified
though they may not be subject to rational criticism. The
desire could be that things go as well as possible in
ones’ s life or the desire could be to make things as good
as possible for everyone.
Clearly, the revised S tends to approach CP. The
fact that the revised S is no longer concerned with all
parts of life equally but emphasizes the near future and
discounts the far future is an indication that the revised
S is closer to CP than the Classical S is. However, as
Bodansky points out, the revised S still does count the
far future and for that reason alone the revised S remains
distinct from CP.
S remains distinct from CP in another way as will.
On S the supremely rational aim is that one’s life go as
well as possible. On CP, however, what one has most
reason to do is that which would best fulfill one s
present desires (whatever they be) as long as they are not
subject to rational criticism. The fact that on S the
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supremely rational aim is specified whereas on CP it is
not is another significant distinction between the two.
f course CP could be amended by the stipulation that the
desire that is not irrational is the desire that
one’s life go as well as possible. However, this
stipulation would eliminate one of the significant
features of CP and would amount to a dismantling of CP.
One of the significant implications of the
Reductionist view is that a given person stage’s
relationship to future or past stages becomes more like
his relationship to contemporary others. Therefore,. in
our moral thinking, future and past stages ought to be
considered as though they are different persons. In
particular, Parfit points out that imprudent acts which
have bad consequences for our future ’’selves” should not
only be considered irrational (to the extent that we are
psychologically connected to that future person) but also
immoral (to the extent that that future person is
different). As Parfit says: ”we ought not to do to our
future selves what it would be wrong to do to other
people. One flaw in Parfit’ s argument is that he
implies that on the Non-reductionist view, in contrast,
actions that have harmful effects on one’s future are
irrational but not Immoral. This is not at all certain.
It is plausible that a Non-redcut ionist would regard such
harmful actions as being both irrational and immoral.
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Regarding a related area of moral thought, Parfit
indicates that holding the Reductionist view will also
affect our views on paternalism - the practice of forcing
someone to act in their own interests. The argument is
based on the above argument in which he concludes that
imprudence is immoral and not just irrational. While it
would seem an infringement on a person’s autonomy to
prevent someone from acting irrationally, we may be just
in preventing them from acting immorally or wrongly.
Parfit concludes: ”we ought to prevent anyone from doing
to his future self what it would be wrong to do to other
people.
C. Reductionism and Desert
On the question of desert <e.g. punishment for wrong
deeds committed)
,
the Reductionist view tends to support
our natural inclination. For instance, it is commonly
thought that the extent to which a person should be
punished for a crime committed in the past is a function
of the time that has elapsed since the crime. For a crime
committed in the distant past, the extent to which the
person deserves to be punished is relatively small. The
provision in United States law which gives individuals
immunity from prosecution for crimes committed many years
earlier is a reflection of this common notion.
The Reductionist outlook on desert coincides with the
common outlook. According to Reductionism, desert for a
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past crime follows from the degree of psychological
connectedness that the current ’’self” has with the
criminal who committed the deed. In cases where a crime
was committed many years previous and where there is
little psychological connectedness, there will be
relatively little desert. Parfit’s approach to this issue
is to consider the criminal’s later self to be an
accomplice to the crime. Just as the accomplice’s desert
will depend on the degree of his complicity in the crime,
so will the desert of the criminal’s later self be
determined by his psychological connectedness with the
criminal. Another approach is to claim that desert for a
past deed follows from one’s personal identity with the
perpetrator of the deed. Since personal identity is a
matter of degree, being determined by psychological
continuity on the basis of psychologt ical connectedness,
so is desert. Where there is little psychological
continuity, there is only a small degree of personal
identity and, therefore, a small degree of desert. A deed
committed by a psychologically distant person stage can
only be partly attributed to the current stage so his
desert is relatively small.
This view though in popular favor is in striking
contrast to the view of Madell, a Non-reductionist. For
Madell, desert is not on the basis of psychological
connectedness, but is on the basis of the ’’further fact”
beyond psychological connectedness and continuity (l.e.
the metaphysical self). By this assumption and
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recognising that personal identity is an all or nothing
thing if based on a metaphysical self, a person is as
of punishment for a crime committed in the
distant past as he is of a recently committed crime. Of
course, Non-reduct ionism is not bound to such a view. It
is possible to believe in a metaphysical self but to think
that desert is a matter of degree, being a function of the
psychological connectedness existing between perpetrator
and the current self.
D. Reductionism and Commitment
With respect to commitments, Parfit offers the
following argument: If we assume that a further fact
beyond psychological or physical continuity is required to
justify keeping promises, then we get two extreme claims.
The Non-reductionist, who believes that a commitment must
be kept because of one’s ultimate identity with the person
who made it, will say that we ought to honor our
commitments because we are the same person when we make
the commitment as we are when we are supposed to fulfill
our obligation. Thus, even though I commit myself now to
doing something (e.g. fighting in a war) which I later
find utterly objectionable (when I become a complete
pacifist), I am still required to fulfill my obligation.
The Reductionist, if he were to assume that full personal
identity over time determines one’s obligation to keep
promises, would claim that since there is no permanent
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self, then Dur future selves are not bound by any promises
made by our present self. According to Parfit, the
extremity of the positions that follow from the assumption
malse it very untemable. One is led to seek another.
Someone who does not believe that a further fact
about persons beyond psychological continuity is required
in order to justify commitments will perhaps claim that
the degree to which I am bound to an earlier commitment is
a function of the degree to which I am psychologically
connected to this earlier person. This claim, though it
is moderate, may be somewhat disturbing. Ve may think
that our commitments ought to be more binding than this
claim indicates. Ve may think that our personal integrity
would require us to honor our obligations though our
personality and our thoughts may change in time. These
kinds of feelings tend to support a claim that we are not
released from our commitments by a mere reduction in
psychological connectedness. Indeed, we might be tempted
to adopt the view that personal identity involves a
further fact beyond psychological connectedness in order
to justify our feelings about commitments. An alternative
explanation is that our feelings about commitments are an
Indication of an unconscious belief in a metaphysical
self. There are other situations which may lead us to
take a different stand. Ve can also Imagine a situation
in which we are considering a previous commitment which
seems as though it were made by a different person. In
this case, we may resent having to honor that commitment.
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One way out of this dilemma would be to cushion our
commitments with conditions. We might say: ”l promise to
do that for you provided I maintain some of my original
motivation and provided fulfilling my promise does not
require that I perform an alien act.” Since it is not
likely that a person will attempt to change themselves in
order to get out of their commitments, this kind of
commitment may be acceptable in some circumstances.
Psrf it provides a case which allows us to further
consider commitments in light of the views on personal
identity that we are investigating. Consider the case of
the "Nineteenth Century Russian”:
In several years, a young Russian will inherit vast
estates. Because he has socialist ideals, he intends,
now, to give the land to the peasants. But he knows
that in time his ideals may fade. To guard against this
possibility, he does two things. He first signs a legal
document, which will automatically give away the land,
and which can be revoked only with his wife’s consent.
He then says to his wife, "Promise me that, if I ever
change my mind, and ask you to revoke this document, you
will not consent. ’ He adds, "I regard my ideals as
essential to me. If I lose these ideals, I want you to
regard your husband then, not as me, the man who
asks you for this promise, but only as his corrupted
later self. Promise me that you would not do what he
asks. ’
The sequel is that the young man matures, becomes less
idealistic, and requests that his wife break her promise
and allow him to keep his land.
Now, the first thing to note is that the language of
successive selves is most appropriate in this case. There
definitely appears to be two distinct persons. There is
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both the young idealistic husband and the older, cynical
husband. This fact is relevant as we ask to whom does the
wife owe her loyalty. On the one hand, it could be said
that she made her commitment to the young man and not to
her current husband who can Justifiably be considered to
be some other person. This position would be consistent
with the Reductionist point of view. On the other hand,
one could claim that the young, idealistic man and the
old, cynical man are still the same person. When she
speaks to her current husband she is speaking to the
person to whom she made her promise. From this Non-
reductionist perspective, we may feel that the wife could
justifiably break her promise upon consulting with the
person to whom she made her promise. On the Reductionist
view, the young, idealistic man to whom she promised no
longer exists and, therefore, cannot be consulted. She is
obligated to keep her promise.
In this instance, holding the Reductionist view as
opposed to the Non-reductionist view affects our moral
judgment about what the wife ought to do. It might seem
that it is a very contrived case and very unlikely to be
met in reality. Yet, a similar situation is presented by
the practice of marriage. Consider the case where one of
the partners changes drastically in time. Is the other
still bound by the commitment? If we adopt the
Reductionist view, then perhaps the original person no
longer exists Ci.e. they have, in a sense, died) and
perhaps the other is released from the commitment.
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E. The Scope of Distributive Justice
Let us now consider the implications of the
Reductionist view on the scope and weight of principles of
distributive justice. I will continue to assume that, if
one holds the Reductionist view and accepts Parfit’s
psychological criterion for personal identity, then, in
may cases, a lifetime can be said to consist of person
stages which can be considered as though they were lived
by different persons. I will also assume principles of
distributive justice to be moral principles concerned with
the just distribution of goods (such as food, shelter, and
education) among person stages (either from a single
lifetime or from separate ones) or among sets of person
stages (a set containing those person stages that are
conventionally considered to comprise a numan life). Note
the choice of the unit over which the distributive
principles apply is very much related to the "scope” of
the principles. Having principles that distribute between
individual person stages as opposede to among sets of
stages indicates a change is scope. Here I will be
concerned with the principle: equally deserving entities
ought to recieve equal shares of goods.
Parfit claims that holding the Reductionist view as
opposed to the Non-Reductionist view has the effect of
increasing the scope of principles of distributive justice
and of reducing their weight. To demonstrate
this, Parfit
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considers "The Child’s Burden".
Ve must decide whether to impose on some
iisi^dship. 11 we do, this will either
child some
(i) be for this child’s own greater benefit in adultlife or
for the similar benefit of someone else —
such as this child’s younger brother
.
Does it matter morally whether (i> or (ii) is true? Most
people would say that it does matter. They would think
that it is right to impose a burden on a child if that
same person will benefit later in life. However, we would
not be justified in placing a burden on one person and
then giving the benefit to someone else. These people
might feel this way because they are Non-Reductionists
(i.e. they believe in a metaphysical self) and because
they believe in the principle of distributive justice.
According to Parfit, a Non-reductionist believes that the
child and the adult are essentially the same person.
Therefore, an inqequitable distribution of
burdens/benefits within one life <i) is permissible
because the same person is recieving the benefits and
burdens. Conversely, an Inequitable distribution between
different lives is not permissible. For the Non-
reductionist the units between which distributive
principles apply are human lifetimes. The scope of the
distributive principles for these Non-reductionist does
not include distribution between stages of a given
lifetime.
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According to Parfit, a Reductionist who believed in
the distributive principle, would say that it does not
matter morally whether Ci) or Cii) is true. Since there
is very little psychological connectedness between the
child and the adult, they can be considered to be separate
people just as a given person is separate from
contemporary others. Since different periods of a
person’s life can be considered as if they were lived by
different persons, the scope of the principle of
distributive justice should be enlarged to include just
distribution among the person stages within an
individual’s life. Thus, both options <i) and <ii) above
represent unjust distributions.
So far we have given some support to Parfit’
s
contention that holding the Reductionist view as opposed
to the Non-Reductionist view will lead to an extension of
the scope of principles of distributive justice. This
extension of the scope of principles of distributive
justice to include just distribution among the person
stages within a lifetime is based on the Reduct ionlonist
claim that these persons stages can be considered to be
separate persons.
However, there are other points of view that tend to
undercut the significance that Parfit gives to the
Reductionist view. For Instance, it may be held that,
even if Non-reduct ionism is true, person stages exist
within a lifetime and distributive principles apply to
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them. According to this view. the existence of the
metaphysical self is compatible with the existence of
person stages within a lifetime. Further, holding that
there is such a self does not prevent one from claiming
that distributive principles apply to the personstages
within a lifetime. The significance of Reductlonism is
lessened on this view.
A second point of view that undermines the
significance of Reductlonism is the following. One can
accept Reductlonism and still hold that distributive
principles apply only to sets of continuous person stages,
that is, lifetimes. For instance, one might hold that
harms and benefits ought to be distributed equally to
equally deserving sets of continuous person stages. The
Reductionist is not required to apply distributive
principles to the person stages within a lifetime.
By these objections, it appears that both
Reductlonism and Non-reduct ionism are compatible with the
view that the principle of distributive justice applies
within a lifetime. In addition, both Reductlonism and
Non-reduct ionism can be compatible with the view that the
distributive principle does not apply within a lifetime.
Nevertheless, Parfit’s claim is still plausible if
presented in the following form: it is more plausible on
the Reductionist view than on the Non-reductionist view
that the distributive principle applies within a lifetime.
The plausibility of this claim is heightened if 1> the
distributive principle is primarily concerned with the
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distribution between separate persons (not between mere
person stages) and if 2) on the Reductionist view, it is
niore plausible that a lifetime contains person stages that
can be considered as separate persons.
F. The Weight of Distributive Principles
Let us now turn to Parfit’s claim that holding the
Reductionist view will lead to a reduction of the weight
of the principles of distributive justice. In developing
this point, I will make use of the following distributive
principle: equally deserving persons should get equal
shares of burdens/benefits. Parfit’s argument supporting
the claim is based on the premise: it is right to impose
on some child some hardship for this child’s greater
benefit in adult life (Step 1). Next we can say that in
some cases it is right to give an individual as a child
and that individual as an adult unequal shares of
burdens/benefits (Step 2). Next, we make use of Parfit’s
Reductionist claim that an individual as a child and that
individual as an adult are, to a large extent, different
persons because of the limited degree of psychological
continuity/connectedness existing between them. They are
different, distinct person stages which can be considered
to be different persons (Step 3). Further, if they are
different persons, independent of one another, then they
are equally deserving (Step 4). Therefore, the child and
the adult are equally deserving persons (step 5). From
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here we can show that the principle of distributive
Justice does not have weight. If it did have weight,
then, because they are equally deserving persons, the
child and the adult should get an equal share of benefits
and burdens (Steps 7-10). It follows that it would be
wrong to give the child and the adult unequal shares (11)
But we have already stated that in some cases it is right
^ S 1 the chi Id and adult unequal shares. Since our
assumption that distributive principles have weight lead
to this contradiction, we have shown that they have no
weight. We can represent this argument in the following
way:
1) It is right to impose on some child some
hardship for their greater benefit later
on when they are an adult.
2) It is right to give an individual as a child
and that individual as an adult unequal shares
of burdens/benefits.
(if the sum of burdens/benefits is maximized)
3) An individual as a child and that individual
as an adult are separate person stages and
can be considered to be separate persons.
4) Different, distinct persons are equally
deserving persons.
5) An individual as a child and that individual
as an adult are equally deserving persons.
6) SHOW: distributive principles have no weight.
7) Distributive principles have weight.
8) If distributive principles have weight.
Then it is obligatory that equally
deserving persons get an equal share.
Assumption
Def. of
distributive
principles
Premise
1
Reduc-
t ionism
Reduc-
t ionism
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9 )
10 )
11 )
12 )
It is obligatory that equally deserving persons
get an equal share.
IS obi. that the child and adult get equal
shares.
It is wrong to not give the child and the adult
equal shares. Def
.
of obi.
It is right to give the adult and the
child unequal shares and it is wrong to give them
unequal shares.
This argument, in the first place, hinges on the
acceptance of the premise: ”It is right to burden a child
for this child’s own greater benefit in adult life." Many
people will accept it because they think that it is right
that an individual endure difficult times if, on the
whole, utility (usually the utility within that
individual’s life) is maximized. Parfit points out that
this is common practice in medicine:
[Doctors] would be right to choose some operation which
would give their patients a smaller total sum of
suffering, even though this suffering would all come
within one period. We do not think that this would be
unfair to this person during this period.
The second step is basically a restatement of the first
premise, with the exception that the condition of
maximizing utility a parenthetic element. In this
argument we are really only concerned with cases where the
sum of benef its/burdens is maximized. If this utility
were not maximized there would be no reason to distribute
inequitably between the adult and the child. Therefore, I
leave out this condition in the remainder of the argument.
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The third step - that an Individual as a child and
that individual as an adult can be considered to separate
— even though it is one of the major claims of
Reductionism is still problematic. Clearly, an
individual as a child and that individual as an adult are
not entirely separate persons even on Parfit’s definition.
There is usually some degree of psychological continuity
between the stages of childhood and adulthood so we cannot
say that the child and the adult are entirely distinct
’’persons”. Along the same lines, it cannot be said that
the child and the adult are equally deserving because the
desert ot the adult must in at least a small measure be a
function of the behaviour of the child. However, we can
always imagine an extreme case where there is such a small
amount of continuity between the child and adult that we
can Justifiably consider them to be separate persons.
This objection is similar to the previously discussed
objection to Parfit's argument that Reductionism implies
the enlargement of the distributive principles* scope.
Recall the previous objection: even after denying the
self it is conceivable that a Reductioist would think that
complete chains of person stages, that is, lifetimes, not
individual stages are the appropriate unit among which
benef its/burdens should be distributed. It is plausible
that people hold this point of view because they deny that
the child and adult are separate persons in the sense that
contemporary others, for example, are separate persons.
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If this is the case, then it can be claimed that the same
objection applies to both arguments.
Even if we are not convinced by Parfit’s argument, it
gets us thin.king. If l) we thought of the person stages
of a lifetime more as separate persons than as parts of a
single person’s life, and 2) if we thought that
distributive principles might apply to the person stages
as there is no ultimate connection between them and as
they can be quite independent of one another and 3) if we
still thought that it is right to burden a child for that
child’s later benefit as an adult, then to achieve logical
consistency in one’s thinking one will be required to give
less emphasis to distributive principles.
Another objection to this argument is to claim that
the reason why it is right to burden a child for that
child’s later benefit as an adult is that any other
distribution of burdens/benefits (such as pampering the
child) would result in a significant overall decrease in
utility or happiness. Hence, even if we hold the
Reductionist view and consider the person stages in a
lifetime to be separate persons (among whom we should
distribute justly), the fact that we choose to maximize
utility in that lifetime taken as a whole does not mean
that the principles of distributive justice are generally
weak. Rather, in this particular case, the principle of
maximizing utility predominates because alternative
practices would have significantly lower utility. On this
view, there are two principles that together determine
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what Is right and wrong: ths principle of maximizing
Utility and the principle of distributive justice. The
principle of niaxiiniz ing utility is predominant because the
amount of totally utility to be gainled by burdening the
child is great relative to the small loss in equity.
On the other hand, it can be objected that, at most,
this argument only proves that the strength of
distributive principles as they are applied within a
single lifetime is not so great. The argument does not
concern distributive principles as they are applied to
contemporary persons. However, this objection is really a
denial that there are separate "persons” in a lifetime.
One might hold that because there is continuity between
"person stages" in a lifetime, they are not different
"persons” to the extent that contemporary "persons" are
different. This much seems justifiable. Consistent with
this objection we might hold that the weight of
distributive principles is a function of the degree of
separation or difference between "persons". Hence,
showing that distributive principles within a lifetime are
not so weighty does not mean that, in general,
distributive principles are less weighty.
Parfit offers another approach in his effort to
demonstrate the significance of the Reductionist view. He
claims we can judge the moral significance of the
Reductionist view on the basis of its support of
Utilitarianism, an ethical theory. Consider the following
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argument. First, we assert the premise that it is right
to maximize the total sum of burdens/benefits within a
lifetime (here we should consider burdens to be negative
benefits). Next consider Parfit’s claim that there are
two propositions which give reasons why it is right to
maximize over a lifetime:
a) It is right to maximize over a lifetime because
ultimately there is a single entity living that
lifetime.
OR
b) It is right to maximize over a lifetime only because
it is right to maximize.
The next step is to note that on the Reductionist view, a
lifetime is not lived by a single entity. Therefore, the
proposition, a, and its reason for maximizing over a
lifetime is invalid. We are left with proposition b. By
this argument Parflt claims that Reductionism supports
utilitarianism. Parfit’s argument is flawed by not
admitting the other possibility:
c) It is right to maximize over a lifetime because of the
particular combination of physical and psychological
continuity and connectivity that exists over a lifetime.
n this option while we may admit the existence of person
stages and deny the self, we still hold that the set of
person stages that make up a human lifetime is the
appropriate unit over which to maximize.
Parfit claims the Reductionist view may support the
utilitarian principle of maximization in other ways as
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well. Recall Parfit’s- claim: the fact that personal
identity (or the unity of life) is
-less deep- leads to
the view that the difference between lives (the non-
identity of different persons) is in its nature
-less
deep-. If this is the case, then it is right to treat
benefits and burdens as if it made less moral difference
where they came.-®-' This argument shows how the
Reductionist view supports giving distributive principles
less weight. If distributive principles are given less
weight on the Reductionist view, then Utilitarianism which
advocates giving them no weight is more plausible on the
Reductionist view. This argument can be represented as
follows:
1. Personal Identity is less deep Reduc-
t ionism
2. If personal identity is less deep, the Premise
difference between persons is less deep.
3. The difference between persons is less deep. 1,2
4. If the difference between persons is less deep. Premise
then it is right to treat benefits and burdens
as if it made less moral difference where they
came
.
5. It is right to treat benefits and burdens as if 3,4
it made no moral difference where they came.
The first premise follows directly from the Reductionist
view. If personal identity does not include the existence
of a permanent self or subject of experience which is
separate from the body and brain and mental and physical
events, then it is -less deep”. Note that this is a
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metaphysical claim. It amounts to nothing more than the
denial of the metaphysical self.
The second premise which was discussed earlier is
perhaps more controversial. One might claim that the
Reductionist statements about personal identity do not
affect the relationship between individuals. On this
view, while the Reductionist claims that the parts of a
lifetime are less deeply unified, he is not saying
anything about the unity or disunity that exists between
separate persons. The question of whether there is a
metaphysical self has no effect on the relations between
persons. However, as I pointed out earlier, if implicitly
we are concerned with the "depth” of the separateness of
persons relative to what is involved in personal identity,
then it is more plausible to claim that the separateness
of persons is less deep. If the depth of the relations
between contemporaries is relative to the depth of the
relation between person stages (i.e. the depth of persinal
identity) and if this depth is less on the Reductionist
view, then the relations or connections between people
will be stronger and their separation less deep.
As we discussed earlier Parfit justifies this premise
by asserting that there is just one fact, personal
identity (i.e. sameness of person) and its denial,
doing so, he relativizes the depth of the separateness
non-identity of different persons to the depth of personal
identity. On this basis, he concludes that
personal
identity is ’’less deep". If this
interpretation is
In
or
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correct
,
then
,
in order to determine the significance of
Parf it’s claim concerning the we ight of distributive
principles
,
we must determine whether the weight of
distributive principles is a function of the relative
depth of the separateness of persons or of the absolute
depth. It is plausible to hold that knowing the depth of
the separateness of persons without reference to the depth
of personal identity leaves one without a basis for
determining the importance of distributing between them
justly. Surely, if the ’’depth” of personal identity was
less (while, the separateness was in an absolute sense the
same) it would seem less important to distribute between
them justly. For example, if being a person was like
being an ant, then there would be less of a concern to
distribute justly between them. Parfit’s argument is
plausible. If we accept that the separateness or non-
identity of different people is less on the Reductionist
view, and if we accept that the strength of distributive
principles should be a function of the distinctness or
separateness of the entities among which they distribute,
then it is plausuble that distributive principles should
be given less weight on the Reductionist view. This
conclusion, however, falls short .. of proving
Utilitarianism. At most we can say that on Reductionism
as opposed to Non—reduct ionism Utilitarianism is more
plausible
.
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This argument makes the same point as the analogy
about nations discussed earlier. Since a nation Is
nothing other than the existence of its citizens, it is
right to focus upon the citizens and emphasize their
personhood rather their nationality. Similarly. since
there is no person or self existing separate from a body
and brain and a stream of experiences, it is right to
focus on their experiences rather than on ’’who” is having
the experiences. By this analogy it is right to give less
weight to principles of distributive justice.
G. Other Views
Thomas Nagel, while agreeing that Parfit’s view of
personal identity may lead to an extension of the scope of
principles of distributive Justice to include the
’’persons” within a given lifetime, feels that the
Reductionist view does not affect the weight of
distributive principles as they apply to a group of people
at a given moment. Nagel gives an example to
demonstrate his point. A man has two sons, the first is
very happy while the second is handicapped and is very
unhappy. The man has the possibility of moving his family
to the city which has better services for handicapped
people though it is otherwise an undesirable location.
The effect of the move would be to relieve some of the
distress of the handicapped son while the other son will
suffer a loss in happiness somewhat greater than the gain
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that the handicapped son experiences. The man recognises
that it is right to relieve the handicapped son, out of
respect for the principle of equality, even though the
total utility would decrease. Nagel points out:
these thoughts do not depend on any idea of personal
identity over time, though they can employ such an idea.
All that is needed to evoke them is a distinction
between persons at a time. The impulse to distributive
equality arises so long as we can distinguish between
two experiences being had by two persons and their being
had by one person. The criteria of personal identity
over time merely determine the size of the units over
which a distributive principle operates.
Nagel’s point of view is as follows. First, he states
that "the impulse to distributive equality” arises from
the distinction of one person from another. Second, he
implies that the Reductionist view of personal identity
only pertains to changes in persons thru time and has
nothing to do with the significance of distributive
justice at a given time. Nagel must have either 1) denied
that the differences or boundaries between people are any
less significant on the Reductionist view or 2) he assumed
that distributive equality is based on an "impulse”
independent on the "depth” of the separateness of persons
though dependent on there being a distinction between
persons. These are two ways in which one may arrive at a
conclusion different from Parfit.
If we accept Parft’s argument that the separation or
non-identity of persons is less deep on the Reductionist
view, then we can evaluate Nagel’s view by determining
whether the weight of distributive principles is affected
58
by the "depth” of the distinction (or separation) of
persons or whether distributive principles are fully
weighted as long as there is a distinction - regardless of
its status. Let us suppose that the weight of
distributive principles was independent of the nature of
the distinction between persons. This would mean that
distributive principles would have the same weight whether
"different persons" are ultimately different (that is,
they are separate, non-identical souls) or whether they
are conventionally different. For example, it may be that
our culture has decided to think of "different persons" as
being separate and distinct, but another culture which
emphasizes group living does not distinguish or see
barriers between "individuals" but only sees a continuum.
(Some materialists might have the same view. )
Alternatively, that other culture might distinguish
between families but not between individuals. It is
plausible that, if distinctions between "different
persons" was seen as conventional and even arbitrary, then
less weight would be given to distributive principles.
Moral principles, if they aspire to universality, cannot
be based on mere conventions. Therefore, the ontological
status or the nature of the distinctions between persons
will indeed affect the weight of distributive principles.
Nagel’s view is made implausible by these considerations.
If the nature of the distinction between
(or the
separateness of) "different persons" is affected by
the
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nature then the
weight
of personal identity as Parfit claims,
of distributive principles will also be affected.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
The denial of the metaphysical self has some ethical
implications, but the overall ethical significance of the
self’s denial ms less than Parfit claims. Two claims are
central to attempts to demonstrate the significance of the
self’s denial. First, there is Parfit’ s claim that, on
the Reductionist view, a lifetime consists of multiple
’’person stages” which can be considered to be separate
persons. A number of ethically significant statements
follow from this claim. They include: 1) actions, that
would be considered immoral for the harm they do to others
should also be considered immoral if they harm future
’’selves” and 2) principles of distributive justice apply
within one lifetime and they ought to be given less
weight. The latter claim - that distributive principles
apply within a lifetime - can be denied by someone who,
though accepting Reduct ionism, feels that distributive
principles can only be applied to sets of continuous
person stages (i.e. lifetimes). I have suggested that
people who hold this view probably do so because they deny
person stages can truly be considered separate persons.
Most peoples’ views on desert and commitment would
not be significantly affected by the claim that a lifetime
consists of multiple ’’persons”. For example, most people
already think that one may be less deserving of punishment
for deeds done in the distant past when one was a
quite
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different person. Similarly, even Non-Reductionists may
already feel that, in some cases, one is not bound to
commitments made in the past when one was quite different
However, the Reductionist view may affect our ordinary
views on commitments in some casis. For instance, if in
the past I made a commitment to someone and that ’’person”
longer exists in the Reductionist sense, then I am now
unable to release myself from the commitment by conversing
with that ’’person’s” later ’’self”.
Parfit’s second significant claim is that the
separateness of different persons (relative to the
sameness of a ’’person” throughout their life) may be less
on the Reductionist view. If one holds that the weight of
distributive principles is a function of the degree of
separateness of different persons, then, by this second
claim, these principles would be given less weight. If,
on the other hand, one holds that distributive principles
are fully weighted as long as there is a distinction
between persons, regardless of the depth or status of that
distinction, then one would deny that the weight of
distributive principles is affected by the Reductionist
view. I have argued that the weight of distributive
principles is affected by the status of the distinction
between persons. If the distinction happened to be
conventional — based perhaps on an assumption made by our
particular culture - then a moral principle which
presupposes the distinction will Itself be conventional.
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In
Such a principle would lack universality and would
general, be less significant and weighty than a principle
founded on ultimate truth. The nature or status of the
distinction between persons may well affect the
significance of a principle which presupposes it.
Of course, if one held that moral principles were, in
the first place, based on conventions, then holding the
Reductionist view will not affect their weight for
certainly the Reductionist view does not deny that persons
are conventionally distinct and separate.
One interesting question that deserves some
consideration is whether there can be a basis for our
sense of moral responsibility if there is no self. Parfit
states that psychological continuity is a sufficient basis
for assigning moral responsibility for a past deed.
Similarly Buddhism implies that the causal connection
between our present deeds and future suffering is a
sufficient basis for assigning moral responsibility (see
the appendix). However, in both cases, the more basic
question - why be moral? - is skirted. A simple answer is
that we should be moral because there are moral
principles. But on what basis are moral principles
significant? Are they significant and valuable only
because people, for whatever reason, have interest in them
or do they have Inherent value whether or not there is a
person to appreciate them?
Regardless of the basis for our principles of
distributive Justice, the Reductionist view may lead to a
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reduction in "their significance. If we believe "thaf moral
principles have intrinsic worth, and if the weight of
distributive principles is a function of the nature and
status of the distinction between persons, then the weight
of distributive principles will be affected by
Reduct ionism. On the other hand, if we believe that the
worth of distributive principles is determined only by the
interest that people take in them, then the truth of
Reductionism alone will not affect the weight of these
principles.
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,
Derek. P- 207 Parfit’s view is that personal
identity is established by psychological continuity.
Ve might compare his view with Locke’s. Locke
emphasized the importance of memories of previous
events. This kind of connection was, for Locke, the
basis for assigning personal identity. Parfit, on the
other hand emphasizes continuity on the basis of
overlapping connections. On Parfit’s view, one does
not need to have memories of experiences had twenty
years previous in order to be the same person. In
establishing personal identity, it is sufficient that
there be overlapping of memories and other kinds of
psychological connection.
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10. Nagel Thomas. P- 147.
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